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NO. 48688-2021
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-4985
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Warne Foruria appeals contending the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation and executed his underlying sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Prior to the initial sentencing in this case, the author the presentence report noted that it
“appears [Mr. Foruria] is now making a concerted effort to be a productive and sober member of
the community. He is in compliance with his parole, has remained drug and alcohol free, and is
gainfully employed.” (Conf. Exh., p.159.) To that point, Mr. Foruria’s employer agreed that he
was a valued worker.

(Conf. Exh., pp.154, 173.) The GAIN-I evaluation also concluded
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Mr. Foruria was stable with his stimulant use disorder, so no additional treatment was needed at
that time. (Conf. Exh, pp.161, 167.) Finally, the PSI author also noted that Mr. Foruria’s parole
officer had already sanctioned him for the actions making up the underlying offense.
(Conf. Exh., p.159.) As such, it recommended the district court follow the sentence as set forth
in Mr. Foruria’s plea agreement.
Specifically, Mr. Foruria had entered an Alford plea1 to one count of possession of a
controlled substance (bath salts) with intent to deliver.

(R., 56.)

appropriate restitution in this matter.

In exchange, the State agreed to

(R., pp.57, 58.)

He also agreed to pay

recommend a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, to be suspended for a four-year
term of probation, and to dismiss a sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.55, 56.) At the sentencing
hearing, Mr. Foruria recommended the district court impose an underlying sentence of three
years, all indeterminate.

(R., p.58.)

The district court ultimately imposed the sentence

recommended by the State. (R., p.61.)
However, approximately two and one-half years into that period of probation, in
approximately June 2020, Mr. Foruria experienced a relapse which resulted in numerous
allegations of probation violations. (See R., pp.73-74.) He ultimately admitted three of those
allegations – (1) failing to attend and complete an assigned treatment program, (5) using
methamphetamine, and (9) drinking alcohol – and the State dismissed the remainder.

(See

Tr., p.6, Ls.17-25.) During that time, Mr. Foruria was screened for placement in the Drug Court
program. (R., pp.125-27.) No decision was made on his eligibility for Drug Court prior to the
disposition hearing. (See generally R., Tr.)
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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Mr. Foruria had told the officers that he had
just purchased the car in which the bath salts were found, and that he did not know they were in
the car. (See, e.g., R., p.48.)
2

At the disposition hearing, Mr. Forurira recommended the district court reinstate
probation with a requirement that he participate in the Drug Court program.

(Tr., p.19,

Ls.19-21.) He asserted that program would help address some of the treatment issues which
crept up during the period of probation when he started to become complacent, which is what led
to the relapse. (Tr., p.21, L.6 - p.22, L.15.) Specifically, defense counsel explained that, when
he recognized he was experiencing a relapse, Mr. Foruria had reached out to his probation officer
to get treatment to try and get the relapse under control. (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-18.) However, he ran
into financial issues in that regard when his insurance lapsed and he had to start paying the costs
of treatment out of pocket. (Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.14.) Drug court, defense counsel explained,
could specifically address and alleviate that particular concern. (Tr., p.21, Ls.16-17.) Defense
counsel argued that would set Mr. Foruria up for successful rehabilitation, particularly since he
still had a job, as well as familial and community support. (Tr., p.21, L.18 - p.22, L.7.)
However, the district court ultimately determined Mr. Foruria would not be a good
candidate for drug court, as it concluded he would be a risk to the other participants. (Tr., p.25,
Ls.18-22.) That determination was apparently based on the fact that, in 2007, Mr. Foruria had
been convicted of aggravated assault. (See Tr., p.18, L.22 - p.19, L.6 (the prosecutor arguing
against placing Mr. Foruira in Drug Court); Tr., p.25, Ls.18-22 (the district court explaining
“having heard the arguments of counsel at this time, I’m finding you not appropriate for the Drug
Court program”).) Defense counsel had argued that old charge should not carry much weight in
the decisions in this case since that conviction was over ten years old at the time of the
disposition hearing. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-5.)
As a result of its determination to exclude Mr. Foruria from Drug Court, the district court
decided to, based on his criminal and treatment history (which included two periods of retained
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jurisdiction), revoke Mr. Foruria’s probation and execute his underlying sentence. (Tr., p.25,
L.23 - p.26, L.2; Tr., p.27, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Foruria filed a notice of appeal timely from the
resulting order. (R., pp.133, 137.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Foruria’s probation and
executed his underlying sentence.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Foruria’s Probation And
Executed His Underlying Sentence
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated
under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977); accord
State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1995). “In deciding whether revocation of
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with protection
of society.” State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). The decision to revoke
probation is one within the district court’s discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312
(Ct. App. 2000). A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one
of discretion, acts beyond the outer limits of that discretion, does not act consistently with the
controlling precedent, or does not reach a decision based on an exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). In this case, a sufficient consideration
of the mitigating factors demonstrates the district court did not reach its decision to revoke
Mr. Foruria’s probation through an exercise of reason.
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To that point, it is important to remember that rehabilitation is a process, not a one-time
event.

See, e.g., State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing the

rehabilitation process by noting that “acknowledgment of guilt is a critical first step toward
rehabilitation”) (emphasis added); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38 n.64 (1967) (acknowledging
that “counsel can play an important role in the process of rehabilitation” for juvenile offenders)
(emphasis added). Therefore, the fact that a person experiences a relapse, even after completing
treatment programs, does not necessarily mean they cannot successfully be rehabilitated.
Compare United States v. Hawkins, 380 F.Supp.2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that
“[t]he fact that the defendant engaged in further criminal activity while she was in the process of
rehabilitation does not preclude a finding of extraordinary rehabilitation” or the imposition of a
more lenient sentence in recognition of that fact). And yet, that was precisely the basis which the
district court gave for its decision. (Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.2.)
Applying the proper standards, the facts of Mr. Foruria’s case demonstrate that he should
have been returned to probation, since probation could still achieve the goal of rehabilitation
without undue risk to society. He was, after all, able to comply with the terms of his probation
for some two and one-half years. (See R., pp.61, 73.) Additionally, when he realized he had
begun to relapse (in the middle of the pandemic shutdown (see R., pp.73-74)), he reached out to
his probation officer for help getting into treatment. (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-18.) However, those
efforts to get additional treatment were undermined when Mr. Foruria’s insurance lapsed and he
had to begin covering those costs out of pocket. (Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.14) And yet, those
hurdles could be managed or removed via a program such as Drug Court. (See Tr., p.21,
Ls.16-17.)

Thus, under the proper standards, probation could still achieve the goal of

rehabilitation without undue risk to society. That is particularly true in Mr. Foruria’s case, since
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he also still had a job, as well as other familial and community support. (Tr., p.21, L.18 - p.22,
L.7.)

Those facts indicate an increased possibility in ultimately being successful with the

rehabilitation process. Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815; State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App.
1991).
As such, the district court’s determination to revoke his probation and execute his
sentence was not an exercise of reason under the applicable legal standards.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Foruria respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his probation
and executing his sentence and remand this case for an order placing him back on probation.
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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